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I.

ARGUMENT

The district court erred when it found that the Respondents were statutory co-employees.
In Idaho, statutory co-employees have always been actual employees of statutory employers.
Additionally, the expansion of immunity the Respondents argue for, undermines the
public policy behind the worker's compensation law. The policy behind the act is to provide
immunity to those employers responsible to provide worker's compensation benefits to injured
workers they employ. That immunity flows to actual employees of those employers under Idaho
Code §72-209(3). The immunity does not flow from employees to the benefit of non-employer
actors such as the Respondents.
The district court's reliance on the Virginia case of Pfeifer v. Krauss, 546 S.E.2d 717
(Va. 2001) was error as the worker's compensation statutes are not ambigious requiring a look to
outside persuasive authority. Respondents contention that the term "employee" includes
business entities is also inconsistent with the context of the entire act.
The district court's order should be reversed and remanded because the Respondents do
not qualify for immunity under Idaho's exclusive remedy rule.
A. Blake v. Starr and White v. Ponozw undermine Respondents' contention that they
are statutory co-employees of Mr. Richardson.

The crux of Respondents argument is that "[t]he statutory employer's immunity extends
to its direct and statutory employees under I.C. §72-209(3) and this Court's holdings in Blake
[citation omitted], and White v. Panozzo [citation omitted] ... " Joint Respondents' Brief, p. 13
(emphasis added). They contend that all statutory employees of a common statutory employer
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are statutory co-employees and immune from tort liability under the exclusive remedy rule. They
argue that all contractors, subcontractors, employees, and agents, who work for or have contracts
with a common general contractor are immune from tort liability between each other without
limitation. Respondents argue for an impermissible expansion of the exclusive remedy rule
without any justified policy reason to do so.
Respondent’s contend that “by statute, Richardson, Z&H, Hernandez, and Unlimited are
all Hayden’s statutory employees and statutory co-employees of one another, and who share
immunity from tort liability under the Worker’s Compensation Law.” Joint Respondent’s Brief,
p. 22. They further contend that this Court has already expressly held this statement to be true
when it stated the following language in Blake v. Starr:
The purpose behind the various provisions of the worker’s compensation law leads
to the conclusion that the employee of a statutory employer and the employee of
his employer’s subcontractor are statutory co-employees under § 72-209(3).
146 Idaho 847, 851, 203 P.3d 1247, 1250 (2009). Respondents misconstrue this language. The
purpose to which this Court referred was providing immunity to a category one statutory
employer by preventing an end run around the exclusive remedy rule by allowing a tort claim
against the statutory employer’s direct employee. This was also the holding of White v. Ponozzo,
77 Idaho 276, 291 P.2d 843 (1955), and Respondents reliance upon those cases is misplaced.
Additionally, it must be kept in mind when reading the above quoted language that it was
written from the viewpoint of the statutory employer’s employee. To put this in context, we can
insert the parties in this case into the language. The statutory employer in this case is Hayden.
The “employee of a statutory employer” refers to an employee of Hayden. The “employee of his
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employer's subcontractor" refers to the employee of Hayden's subcontractor. In this case,
Richardson is an employee of Hayden's subcontractor, Alignment. Thus, the language simply
means that Richardson and Hayden's employees are statutory co-employees. It also means that
any of the Respondent's employees and Hayden's employees are also statutory co-employees.
What Blake does not support is the contention that Richardson and the Respondent LLC's or the
Respondents' employees are statutory co-employees. The purpose behind establishing coemployee status in White and Blake does not exist in that scenario.
In White, the plaintiff and defendant Dykes were both employees of defendant Ponozzo
Brothers. White and Dykes both drove trucks for Ponozzo. White was injured in a collision with
Dykes and sued both Ponozzo and Dykes. 77 Idaho 276,277, 291 P.2d 843, 843-844 (1955).
White claimed he was not an employee of Ponozzo at the time of the crash. This Court
disagreed, finding he was an employee, and as such, Ponozzo was immune from suit under the
exclusive remedy rule. 77 Idaho at 279-280, 291 P.2d at 844-845. This Court then held that
Dykes, as White's actual co-employee, was also immune from liability because the exemption
from liability is extended to co-employees through whom the employer acts. Id., at 280, 845.

White was a rather straight forward application of the worker's compensation laws as it
affects actual co-employees, or employees of the same employer. In Blake, this Court was asked
to determine whether an injured worker could seek recovery from the employee of a statutory
employer, rather than an actual co-employee of the same employer. The Court noted that while
an injured worker has the right to bring a civil action for damages against third parties, the
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worker's compensation laws specifically exclude certain employers from third party liability.

Blake at 850.
Those employers included direct employers and statutory employers. A "statutory
employer" is "anyone who, by contracting or subcontracting out services, is liable to pay
worker's compensation benefits if the direct employer does not pay those benefits." Robison v.

Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 210-211, 76 P.3d 951, 954-955 (2003). Lastly, the Blake
Court discussed I.C. § 72-209 and basic principles of agency law to conclude that a statutory
employer's immunity extends to its own direct employees through whom it acts.
The plain language of the statute encompasses every relationship in which the
employer could be held liable through respondeat superior. I.C. § 72-209(3).
Allowing a suit against an employee of a statutory employer would create vicarious
liability for the employer who is otherwise statutorily immune from liability.

Blake at 851, 1250 (emphasis added). That is the purpose to which this Court referred
when it concluded that an employee of a statutory employer and the employee of its
subcontractor are statutory co-employees. It was to prevent an end run around the exclusive
remedy rule. To hold otherwise would have meant a statutory employer could be responsible to
pay worker's compensation benefits without the benefit of immunity from civil suit. That
situation does not exist with the case at bar. There is no reason to extend immunity to the
Respondents because they were never going to be responsible to pay for Richardson's worker's
compensation benefits.
The Respondents know this. To get around this, the Respondents try to bootstrap
immunity to themselves with an unsupported agency theory via the Respondent LLCs'
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employees. "Because any such liability is derivative of its employee's liability, if the employee
is immune from suit, so is the employer." Respondents' brief at page 17 emphasis added. The
fatal flaw with Respondents' argument, is that under the facts of this case, the employees cannot
claim immune without their employers Z&H, Hernandez, and Unlimited being immune first.
That cannot be the case as Alignment was not contracted by or under any of the Respondents and
none of the Respondents are responsible for Mr. Richardson's worker's compensation benefits.
The Respondents ask this Court to transpose the conclusions of Blake and White and
paste it onto starkly different facts in this case. They do this ignoring the principle that exclusive
remedy immunity flows from an actual employer first. The mismatch of facts was even
acknowledged by the district court when it indicated that no Idaho case match the facts in this
case. R. p. 468.
The Respondents' arguments fail. None of the Respondent LLCs are actual employees of
Hayden Homes (the statutory employer of Mr. Richardson). Because of this, the Respondent
LLCs, nor their employees, could be characterized as statutory co-employees of Mr. Richardson.

Blake and White do not support the defense position that the Respondent LLCs (or their
employees) are statutory co-employees of Mr. Richardson. The Respondents' arguments fail to
harmonize with the Idaho statutes and cases that grant immunity to employers and their actual
employees.

B. Respondents' contention they are co-employees of Mr. Richardson undermines the
public policy behind the Idaho Worker's Compensation law.
1. Respondents' expansion of immunity would create chaos for Idaho's

industry and workmen.
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The Respondents' incorrect reading of Blake and White, as well as their arguments for
umbrella immunity, undermine the public policy behind Idaho's worker's compensation law.
Respondents argue for a dramatic expansion of immunity. This would create chaos rather than
harmony in Idaho industry and with Idaho wageworkers. This would be especially so in the
construction industry that relies heavily upon the worker's compensation law, its underlying
policy, and the statutory employer structure.
As explained in Blake, " .. a statutory employer's immunity from suit under Idaho Code
§72-223 must logically and necessarily be extended to its employees through I.C. §72-209(3) to
fulfill the purpose of the Idaho Worker's Compensation Act." Blake at 851. Immunity flows
from employers to employees. Respondents want this Court to reverse the flow creating a new
vicarious liability analysis/test to assign immunity to contractors, rather than follow the statutory
procedure outlined in Idaho Code §§72-223 and Idaho Code §72-216. Vicarious acts of an
employee may merge with the employer for purposes of determining third party liability or to
determine whether exclusive remedy immunity is granted to the employee. However, that is a
separate analysis from whether a business entity/employer/contractor like the Respondents can
claim to be statutory co-employees of Mr. Richardson by virtue of their own employees.
When reading I.C. §72-223 and §72-216, it is clear that the purpose of the exclusive
remedy rule is to provide immunity to employers and statutory employers first. The actual
employees of those specific employers are then granted immunity via I.C. §72-209(3). There is
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no authority in Idaho that an employee can act as an instrument through which this immunity is
provided to a non-employer actor under Idaho's worker's compensation law.
Idaho's worker's compensation law is a compromise between employers and employees.
Employers provide benefits up front in exchange for immunity from damages claims by their
employees. Employees gave up their right to sue for damages to receive these benefits up front.
The rights to immunity and to benefits only exist within the special relationship between an
employer and their employees. They sit on opposite sides of the bargain that was struck when
the worker's compensation law codified the compromise.
Unlike employers, non-employer third parties do not enter into this agreement with an
injured worker. Non-employers are not responsible to provide worker's compensation benefits
to injured workers. If a party is not liable under the worker's compensation law then that party is
not immunity from a third party claim for damages.
In this case, the Court should note that Respondents are not arguing that they are
somehow liable for Mr. Richardson's worker's compensation benefits in an attempt to claim
immunity. They want this Court to find that they are not liable both for damages and under the
worker's compensation law.
Adopting the Respondents' position creates a disturbing result. Respondents' proposed
rule creates a class of contractor that is not responsible to provide worker's compensation
benefits to injured non-employees and at the same time allow that contractor to claim immunity
from third party suit from a worker they injure. Responsible employers do not even enjoy this
level of immunity. This Court has noted that " .. the Idaho Code sections dealing with the concept
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of statutory employer ‘are designed to prevent an employer from avoiding liability under the
workmen’s compensation statutes by sub-contracting the work to others.” Venters v. Sorrento
Delaware, Inc., 141 Idaho 245, 251, 108 P.3d 392, 398 (2005) citing Spencer v. Allpress
Logging, Inc., 134 Idaho 856, 860, 11 P.3d 475, 479 (2000). If Idaho’s worker’s compensation
law prevents an employer from avoiding providing benefits, then interpreting the same law in a
manner that completely immunized the Respondents would not be consistent with the underlying
policy principle to deter avoiding liability either. Respondents would enjoy the benefits of both
worlds without having to pay any price to receive it.
The practical effect of adopting the district court’s ruling would be far reaching and
disruptive to an industry that employs thousands of businesses and wageworkers within Idaho.
This expansion of immunity would allow contractors under a general contractor to act with
impunity as against other contractors working on a job site. It would shift the cost of the
negligent acts of these contractors to others, namely the contractors/employers of the injured
workers who provide worker’s compensation benefits regardless of fault.
This does not foster certainty nor protect industry as it allows certain contractors to avoid
all liability in both systems. Contractors would operate knowing they would not have to pay for
the harm they cause other sub-contractors on the same job for a common general contractor.
These super-immune contractors would not have to pay for the costs of their negligence. This is
a dangerous expansion of immunity that would create chaos rather than foster harmony in
Idaho’s industry. This undermines the public policy behind the worker’s compensation system
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by harming workers and their employers who responsibly provide worker's compensation
benefits.
2. Granting immunity to the Respondents would not humanely construe
the worker's compensation law in favor of the injured employee, Mr.
Richardson.

This Court "[m Just liberally construe the provisions of the workers' compensation law in
favor of the employee, in order to serve the humane purpose for which the law was
promulgated." Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 141 Idaho 341, 345, 109 P.3d 1084, 1087 (2005).
Adopting the Respondents' position greatly expands the immunity and undercuts an injured
worker's ability to obtain relief against non-employer actors. The humane purpose of the act is
thwarted when a grant of immunity this broad is bestowed upon otherwise undeserving parties.
Granting broad immunity does not make Mr. Richardson whole, yet it would grant the
Respondents the power to avoid responsibility. Respondents would receive immunity without
having participated in the worker's compensation compromise with Mr. Richardson. Were that
to be the case, the system would no longer be a fair compromise. Rather, Respondents'
requested rule renegotiates this compromise in favor of non-employer actors at Mr. Richardson's
expense and that of his employer paying the bills. This is not interpreting the statute in favor of
Mr. Richardson and the humane purpose for which the system exists as a whole. The system
was not designed to allow negligent actors to escape responsibility.
There is no justification to permit the Respondents to receive this grant of immunity
when they are not responsible to provide worker's compensation benefits for Mr. Richardson.
Respondents have no relationship with Mr. Richardson. Alignment and Hayden deserve
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immunity because they are employers of Mr. Richardson. They bore the risk and cost of
providing worker's compensation benefits to Mr. Richardson. They participated in the system
and honored the compromise in providing Mr. Richardson benefits when he was injured.
There is nothing unique or special about the Respondents that justify this immunity to be
granted them in this case. To adopt Respondents' arguments on this issue dramatically expands
immunity and undermines Idaho public policy of providing that immunity to employers and
statutory employers alone.

C. The district court's reliance on the Virginia case of Pfeiffer v. Krauss was incorrect
as Idaho's worker's compensation law is not ambiguous.
This Court has addressed the application of I.C. §72-223 and §72-216 in prior cases. In

Blake the Court held "[t]here is nothing ambiguous or contradictory in these provision of the
Act." Blake at 850. If these statutes are not ambiguous, then the district court should have
applied them to the case at bar. Rather than do so, the district court sought persuasive authority
from Virginia when it found that" ... there is no Idaho case law with identical facts ... " R. p. 468.
The district court then applied theVirginia case of Pfeifer v. Krauss, 546 S.E.2d 717 (Va. 2001)
and concluded that the intent of the act was to provide a more umbrella-like coverage. R. p. 469.
What is absent from the district court's decision and order, was any analysis concerning
whether the exclusive remedy rule applies to the case at bar. The district court did not do any
analysis regarding the status of the Respondents based on I.C. § 72-223 and §72-216. The
district court wrote generally about the exclusive remedy rule and how statutory employers are
immune under the Act. It went as far as to acknowledge that Hayden Homes was a statutory
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employer. But the district court did not analyze or apply the statute to the Respondents in this
case. Instead of completing the statutory analysis as against the Respondents, it applied Pfeifer.
Doing so was not necessary as the statute is not ambiguous.
The district court should have applied Idaho's unambiguous workers' compensation
statutes to the case at bar. There was no need to resort to persuasive authority from Virginia in
this case as the statute itself provides the answer the Legislature intended. Had the district court
applied the statute, it would have determined that none of the Respondents could be statutory coemployees of Mr. Richardson.
D. The legislature did not intend for the term "employee" to include business entities.

"Worker's compensation statutes must be considered in the context of the entire act."
Meisner v. Potlatch Corporation, 131 Idaho 258,262,954 P.2d 676, 680 (1998). The defense is

correct that the term "employee" includes the term "person." The term person is defined by
Idaho Code §72-102(24) which states that the term includes "any political subdivision thereof, or
any individual, partnership, firm, association, trust, corporation, including the state insurance
fund, or any representative thereof." The Respondents use this statute as the foundation of their
argument that as a business entity, they can be an "employee."
However, when reading the definition of "employee" under Idaho Code §72-102(12) in
the context of the entire act, it is clear the Legislature was describing a natural person.
"Workman" by its very words show the Legislature meant a human being. To interpret
otherwise would create absurd results. See Appellant's brief at IV.A.2 for examples of some of
these absurdities illustrating the context of the entire act in interpreting "employee."
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As such, Respondents' contention that the Legislature intended for the term "employee"
to mean also political subdivision, partnership, firm, association, trust, corporation, the State
Insurance Fund, or LLC is a stretch of the plain language, intent, and context of the entire act.
When the Legislature talks about employees under the act, the Legislature intended it to mean
natural people.

II.

CONCLUSION

The Respondents cannot be statutory co-employees of Mr. Richardson and cannot qualify
for immunity under the exclusive remedy rule. Immunity flows from employers to employees.
None of the Respondents are employers of Mr. Richardson. As such the district court's finding
that the Respondents are statutory co-employees fails under Idaho law and should be reversed.
Only employers received immunity.
Finding that the Respondents are statutory co-employees also undermines the public
policy that supports the worker's compensation law. It is employers that can claim the benefits
of exclusive remedy rule immunity, not non-employer actors like the Respondents. Respondents
do not qualify for immunity under Idaho's exclusive remedy rule because they did not pay the
price to obtain this immunity by providing benefits to Mr. Richardson. Adopting the district
court's ruling on this matter ignores the humane purpose behind the worker's compensation law
to the detriment of the injured worker and his/her employer. This ruling would create chaos in
Idaho industry by shifting who pays for the consequences of an actor's negligence to employers
alone. The purpose of the law is to provide immunity to those employers that are responsible to
provide benefits to injured workers. The purpose behind the law is not to allow negligent
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contractors with no relation to Mr. Richardson to escape liability in every aspect. Respondents
do not qualify for this immunity.
The district court's reliance on the Pfeifer case was not necessary as the statute was not
ambiguous. Lastly, the Respondents' contention that employee also can mean a business entity
like the Respondents, is inconsistent with the context of the entire act.
The district court's finding on summary judgment should be reversed as there is no basis
in Idaho law to find Respondents qualify for immunity in this case. Mr. Richardson respectfully
requests that this Court reverse and remand the district court's decision granting the
Respondents' motions for summary judgment.
Dated this 11 th day of June, 2019.
SKAUG LAW, P.C.

Isl Matthew Andrew
Matthew C. Andrew, of the firm
Attorneys for Appellant
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